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Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is often accompanied by atypical visual attention to 
faces. Previous studies have identified some predictors of atypical visual attention in 
ASD but very few have explored the role of conversational context. In this study, the 
fixation patterns of 19 typically developing (TD) children and 18 children with ASD 
were assessed during a SKYPED conversation where participants were asked to converse 
about mundane vs. emotion-laden topics. We hypothesized that 1) children with ASD 
would visually attend less to the eye region and more to the mouth region of the face 
compared to TD children and that 2) this effect would be exaggerated in the emotion-
laden conversation. With regard to hypothesis 1, we found no difference between groups 
for either number of fixations or fixation time; however, children with ASD did evidence 
significantly more off-screen looking time compared to their TD peers. An additional 
analysis showed that compared to the TD group, the ASD group also had greater average 
fixation durations when looking at their speaking partner’s face (both eyes and mouth) 
across conversational contexts. In support of hypothesis 2, eye tracking data (corrected 
for amount of time during conversation) revealed two interaction effects. Compared to 
the TD group, the ASD group showed 1) a decreased number of fixations to eyes and 2) 
an increased fixation time to mouths but only in the emotion-laden conversation. We also 
examined variables that predicted decreased number of eye fixations and increased 
mouth-looking in ASD in the emotion-laden conversation. Change scores (to be 
understood as the degree of visual attention shifting from the mundane to the emotion-
laden condition) for the ASD group negatively correlated with age, perceptual reasoning 
skills, verbal ability, general IQ, theory of mind (ToM) competence, executive function 
(EF) subscales, and positively correlated with autism severity. Cognitive mechanisms at 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is often accompanied by atypical visual 
attention to social stimuli including attention to people’s bodies and faces (Riby & 
Hancock, 2009), as well as marked impairment in eye contact during social interaction 
(Doherty-Sneddon, Riby, & Whittle, 2012; Lord, Risi, Lambrecht, Cook, Leventhal, & 
Di Lavore, 2000). Deficits in emotion and face recognition are also common (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997). To better understand these atypicalities, much 
research has focused on how individuals with ASD and their typically developing (TD) 
peers process faces. Although mixed results in the literature have occurred, these 
discrepancies are partly accounted for by variation in task demands, methods of study, 
and participant characteristics (e.g., chronological age, language level, gender, ASD 
severity) (Harms, Martin, & Wallace, 2010).  
 Studies of ASD and TD between-group differences have been valuable for 
illuminating potential mechanisms that may be operating to produce atypical face 
processing in ASD (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; Doherty-Sneddon et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, it is firmly established that ASD is not a monolithic disorder and what has 
rarely been addressed is what factors predict individual differences in face processing 
within this population. In a related vein, little is known about the contextual features that 
influence visual attention in ASD. This study aims to address these limitations in the 
literature by examining how conversational topic affects visual attention. This is 
accomplished by comparing visual attention during a mundane conversation in which 
children are asked to talk about “things that people do” and an emotion-laden 
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conversation that is designed to place demands on children’s ‘theory of mind’ and asks 
children to talk about “things that people feel.” The study also aims to identify within-
group participant characteristics that predict patterns of visual attention to faces in ASD 
and TD. 
 This literature review will 1) describe the theory of mind deficit characteristic of 
ASD, 2) describe findings from behavioral and eye tracking research in face processing 
in ASD, 3) discuss findings from brain imaging studies in face processing in ASD, 4) 
examine within-group differences in ASD for atypical visual fixation patterns, and 5) 
discuss the importance of context and its effects on the looking patterns of persons with 
ASD. It will ultimately be argued that an examination of between and within-group 
differences to compare performance between two conversational contexts is an important 
contribution for understanding visual attention to faces in ASD. 
1.1 Theory of Mind Deficits of ASD 
 Theory of Mind (ToM; also commonly referred to as social cognition, 
perspective-taking, mentalizing, or mind-reading, Hutchins & Prelock, in press) may be 
defined as the ability to infer the mental states of others so as to know “that other people 
know, want, feel, or believe things” (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985, p. 38). Baron-
Cohen (1995/2001) described ToM as a key component of mindreading and reported 
numerous findings in which children with ASD fail to employ a ToM, thus demonstrating 
“mindblindness” (p. 5) or the inability to read others’ mental states. Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985) suggested that ToM is a core cognitive deficit of ASD and found that those with 
ASD underperformed on false belief tasks compared to those with Down syndrome and 
TD controls despite the fact that the TD group and group with Down syndrome exhibited 
3  
lower verbal and non-verbal MA than the group with ASD. The authors concluded that 
the inability to pass the false belief task was not due to other cognitive or performance 
factors and that participants with ASD differed from normal controls and those with 
severe intellectual disability precisely because they were unable to “appreciate the 
difference between their own and the doll’s knowledge” (p. 43). While Baron-Cohen et 
al. (1985) found that individuals with ASD experience difficulty distinguishing their own 
from others’ perspectives (and this was taken as evidence for an impaired ToM), some 
individuals with ASD routinely demonstrate an ability to employ various aspects of ToM 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Bowler, 1992; Happe, 1993; Ozonoff, Pennington, & Rogers, 
1991) lending credibility to the notion that ToM is not uniformly affected in ASD. These 
findings gain importance in light of the fact that ToM is a complex and multifaceted 
construct. Indeed, deficits in ToM in ASD are not monolithic (Hutchins & Prelock, in 
press).  
The ToM model has proven to be a particularly influential hypothesis for 
explaining the social deficits characteristic of ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1992, 1995/2001) and 
has gained considerable currency in the face processing and eye tracking literature as 
well. According to Hernandez and colleagues (2009), “face perception plays a critical 
role in the development of social interaction and understanding of the internal emotional 
state of others” (p. 1004) and the eye region of the face is particularly important for 
recognizing others’ mental states. In a related vein, Riby and Doherty (2009) used eye 
tracking technology to study the ability of children with ASD to detect an examiner’s 
gaze direction and found that young participants with ASD had difficulty detecting the 
target of the examiner’s gaze. In short, gaze direction can indicate the mental states of 
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others, is considered one measure of ToM (as it involves joint attention and 
intentionality; see Baron-Cohen, 1995/2001), and children with ASD tend to demonstrate 
difficulty in gaze monitoring (Mundy, Sigman, & Kasari, 1996). Similarly, Rutherford 
and Towns (2008) noted that participants with ASD spent less time looking at the eye 
region of faces when presented with complex emotions compared to simple emotions. 
This finding is consistent with the results of Baron-Cohen et al. (1997), who concluded 
that individuals with ASD demonstrate an ability to process simple emotions (e.g., happy, 
sad, angry), but tend to have trouble with the recognition of complex mental states (e.g., 
admire, interest, thoughtfulness) and implicates atypical visual attention in the ability to 
perform ToM tasks.   
 ToM and Executive Function. It is important to note that ToM dysfunction 
overlaps considerably with deficits in Executive Function (EF) (e.g., Hill, 2008; 
Pellicano, 2010). Ozonoff et al. (1991) have underscored the importance of EF, noting 
that persons with ASD are often deficient in EF and tend to be impulsive, have poor 
response inhibition, and lack future-oriented planning skills. Indeed, performance on EF 
tasks tends to predict performance on ToM tasks (Hughes, 1998), although the nature of 
the relationship between these constructs and their direction of influence remain a topic 
of debate (Pellicano, 2007, 2010). These considerations foreshadow the difficulty 
encountered when trying to disentangle effects and identify which constructs contribute 
to atypical patterns in core versus secondary ways (Happé, Roland, & Plomin, 2006; 
Pellicano, 2010).  
 Riby and Hancock (2009) used both static (e.g., picture) and dynamic (e.g., 
movie) stimuli to track the eye gaze of participants with ASD, William’s syndrome (WS), 
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and those who were typically developing. Compared to TD peers matched on age and 
non-verbal ability, participants with ASD showed reduced attention to the movie stimuli 
suggesting that they are less interested in or less able to process these types of complex 
stimuli. If this is the case, it is possible that the “complexity of the movie information in 
some way ‘distracts’ or ‘overloads’ the attention of participants with autism in a way that 
is not possible for static images” (p. 179). The potential cognitive overload associated 
with complex stimuli may also mean that if persons with ASD are not accessing social 
information from complex stimuli, they will have fewer opportunities to (naturally) learn 
social cues (Riby & Hancock, 2009). 
Of course (and like ToM), EF is a complex construct that may be carved and 
construed in different ways. One approach to EF divides it into two categories: hot and 
cold (Castellanos, Sonuga-Barke, Milham, & Tannock, 2006). Cold cognition comes into 
play during problems that are decontextualized and abstract (e.g., the Stroop task). Hot 
cognition, however, is required for tasks with affective or motivational significance 
(Castellanos et al., 2006). Hot cognition connects with ToM insofar as the attribution of 
mental states involves the affective domain. As Zelazo, Qu, and Müller (2013) have 
argued “ToM is hot EF as expressed in the content domain of self and social 
understanding” (p. 86).  
A different approach for understanding the connection between EF and ToM 
involves examination of two subcomponents of EF: working memory and inhibition (see 
Moses, Carlson, & Sabbagh, 2005/2013). Working memory has been described as “the 
maintenance of transient information over brief temporal intervals to direct future-
oriented activity” (Welsh, 2002/2008, p. 144), whereas inhibition is the ability to 
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suppress inappropriate and maladaptive responses and engage in those behaviors that are 
more appropriate. Moses et al., (2005/2013) described a number of studies that discuss 
the correlation between ToM and the working memory/inhibition components of EF. 
These authors propose that failure on false belief tasks may be due to an inability to 
remember one’s own belief in light of the protagonist’s belief (i.e., a working memory 
hypothesis) or the inability to suppress one’s knowledge of facts evident in the task (i.e., 
an inhibition hypothesis). In summary, the ToM hypothesis of ASD has been linked to 
atypical face processing in ASD. While ToM and EF are associated in TD and ASD, the 
direction of effects is unclear and the nature of our understanding of ToM and EF 
connections is influenced by how we construe each: a topic that will be revisited later in 
this manuscript. 
1.2 Face Processing in ASD 
The ability to recognize faces and process both basic and complex emotions is an 
important skill because it provides information to guide successful social interactions 
(Ashwin, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2006) including a person’s mood, intentions, 
attentiveness, and identity (Bruce & Young, 1986). This selective review will describe 
some earlier studies that used static face stimuli. This will be followed by a discussion of 
more recent studies that used dynamic stimuli.  
Some earlier studies using static stimuli. Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) tested the 
ability of adults with ASD to identify basic emotions and complex mental states using 
whole-face photographs and photographs depicting only the eye-region of the face. 
Results showed that participants with ASD were relatively good at detecting basic 
emotions but relatively impaired at recognizing the complex mental states in the whole-
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face condition. Further, the ASD participants were more impaired at identifying the 
complex mental states in the eyes-only condition. The ability to recognize others’ 
emotions is essential to social functioning and the difficulty that participants with ASD 
demonstrated in the eyes-only task suggests that persons with ASD are less inclined or 
less able to make use of this information.  
Other research has found impaired face recognition to be dependent on certain 
Areas of Interest (AOIs). Using eye tracking technology (discussed more fully below), 
Joseph and Tanaka (2003) noted that persons with ASD had an increased ability to 
recognize static faces when recognition was dependent upon the mouth region as opposed 
to the eye region of the face. The opposite effect was found for the TD group who relied 
more heavily on the eye region and less so on the mouth region for facial recognition. 
This evidence suggests that when deciphering emotional cues, persons with ASD tend to 
rely on information in the mouth region as opposed to the social cues provided by the 
eyes. Langdell (1978) concluded that if children with ASD do not view the eyes as social 
stimuli, then the eyes and the mouth must “rank equally as the most easily discriminable 
areas if the human face” (p. 265), lending a possible explanation for mouth-looking in 
ASD. This is also consistent with the contentions of Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) that 
persons with ASD are not gathering information from the eyes and are  “not acquiring a 
language of the eyes in the same way [as their peers]” (p. 329). 
Results are mixed for the visual allocation patterns observed in ASD when studies 
employ static stimuli. Snow and colleagues (2011) found that, like their TD peers, 
persons with ASD showed a strong preference for the eye region over other areas of the 
face. In a study examining adults with Asperger Syndrome (AS) and TD matched 
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controls, Falkmer, Larsson, Bjällmark, and Falkmer (2010) determined which regions 
participants attended to during face recognition tasks. By using puzzle pieced photos as 
well as intact photos, Falkmer and colleagues found that participants with AS had more 
difficulty in the facial recognition task when the eye region in the puzzled-piece photo 
was distorted or not fully intact. These results demonstrate a strong reliance on the eye 
region in face recognition tasks for participants with AS and does not support previous 
research that participants with ASD show a strong tendency toward fixating on the mouth 
area in photographs. Static stimuli, however, may not provide adequate information about 
real-life to observers with ASD and may yield “decreased ecological validity” 
(McPartland, Webb, Keehn, & Dawson, 2011, p.153). Dynamic stimuli provide more 
naturalistic social information to which individuals with ASD may have difficulty 
attending as evidenced by their atypical fixation patterns (Klin, Jones, Schultz, & 
Volkmar, 2003).  
Studies using dynamic stimuli. More recently, eye tracking technology has been 
employed to examine atypicalities in visual attention to dynamic social stimuli in ASD. 
These types of studies allow researchers to more fully explore the visual patterns 
associated with ASD, which may prove valuable for understanding how persons with 
ASD view and understand the social world (Freeth, Chapman, Ropar, & Mitchell, 2010; 
Jones & Klin, 2008; Riby & Hancock, 2008). Jones and Klin (2008) suggested that a 
child who does not focus on socially relevant stimuli (e.g., a person’s face or eye gaze) 
may see a world in which physical events are more salient than social cues. In effect, this 
could alter the child’s development to the extent that “the child’s mind would specialize 
on physical contingencies rather than on social beings. Consequently, it would suggest 
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that later in life [the child’s] brain and…behavior will also show equally atypical 
specialization” (p. 69).   
Shic, Bradshaw, Klin, Scassellati, and Chawarska (2011) examined the gaze 
patterns of toddlers with ASD compared to TD and developmentally delayed (DD) peers. 
They found that, while watching another child and adult interact, toddlers with ASD 
spent significantly more time than TD and DD peers attending to the background of the 
scene compared to the activity taking place between the adult and child. Moreover, while 
the toddlers with ASD and those who were TD and DD spent similar amounts of time 
attending to the people in the scene, closer examination revealed that children with ASD 
spent more time looking at the person’s body compared to the person’s head. In a similar 
study by von Hofsten, Uhlig, Adell, & Kochukhova (2009), findings revealed that 
compared to TD controls, young children with ASD spent less time fixating on the 
speaker’s face when the speaker was engaged in a conversation with a listener. TD 
controls also looked significantly longer at the speaker’s face than did participants with 
ASD.  
Research also suggests that older children with ASD show a preference for non-
face stimuli when viewing dynamic scenes. For example, Bird, Press, and Richardson 
(2011) found that children with ASD spent less time fixating on face stimuli compared to 
TD controls when viewing video stimuli. In addition to atypical looking patterns 
described above, dynamic stimuli studies often find that when the face is the focus of 
attention, participants with ASD show a preference for looking at the mouth region 
instead of the eyes (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Norbury et al., 2009). 
To better understand the real world implications for looking patterns and social 
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competence, Klin et al. (2002) used eye tracking technology to examine the visual 
allocation patterns of adolescents and young adults with ASD and TD participants while 
they watched emotionally charged videos that were more analogous to real-life situations 
compared to static photos. Researchers chose video clips from the film “Who’s Afraid of 
Virginia Woolf?” because the “demanding social complexity in the movie mirror[ed] 
complicated social situations that individuals with autism may encounter in everyday 
settings” (p. 811). Results were consistent with the authors’ predictions that individuals 
with ASD would focus more on the mouth, body, and object regions compared to the eye 
region (TD peers spent most of the time looking at the eye region). These results were 
replicated in Norbury et al., (2009) who examined the visual fixation patterns of 
adolescent ASD and TD participants. These researchers used less emotionally complex 
videos than those of Klin et al., (2002) but the video clips portrayed social interactions 
that prompted a variety of emotional responses. Results indicated that verbally able 
adolescents with ASD spent less time looking at the eyes and more time looking at the 
mouth compared to those participants with ASD that were language impaired or typically 
developing (Norbury et al., 2009). Similarly, Bird et al. (2011) found a significant 
preference for the eye region of the face in the TD control group, but not for participants 
with ASD. 
Of interest to the present study are also the within-group findings of visual 
fixation patterns observed in ASD and the looking behaviors associated with different 
conversational contexts. Where Klin et al. (2002) found significant between group 
differences, further analyses revealed important within-group differences. Specifically, in 
the ASD group, longer mouth fixation time was associated with higher levels of social 
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adaptation (as defined by scores on the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, Expanded 
Edition) and lower levels of social impairment (as defined by scores on the Autism 
Diagnostic Observation Schedule). Moreover, longer object fixation time was associated 
with lower levels of social adaptation and higher levels of social impairment. Norbury et 
al. (2009) also looked at within-group differences and concluded that language ability 
and “autistic symptomology” (p. 839) were important predictors of functioning. 
1.3 Visual Attention and Conversational Context 
 The current study aims to examine visual attention to a speaking partner when 
participants engage in different topics of conversation. Few studies have reported on the 
effects of conversational context on visual fixation patterns; however Chawarska, Macari, 
and Shic (2012) studied the visual fixation patterns of participants with ASD during 
socially relevant and non-social stimuli. The study consisted of four dynamic scenes (i.e., 
Dyadic Bid, Sandwich, Joint Attention, Moving Toys). In the Dyadic Bid scene the 
actress on the screen looked directly at the camera and engaged in child-directed speech 
(it is important to note that this was not an actual conversation in which the child was 
engaged, but involved the actress talking at the child through the camera); in the 
Sandwich scene, the actress looked down at the table, made a sandwich, and was not 
engaged in speech or eye contact with the camera; in the Joint Attention scene, the actress 
looked at the camera, said “uh-oh,” and then turned her head to look at one of the toys in 
the scene; in the Moving Toys scene, the actress looked at the camera at the same time 
that a toy began moving and making noise, and then the actor looked at the toy on the 
opposite side of the screen than the moving toy. The authors found that, like the TD 
children, the children with ASD did not engage in atypical looking patterns due to the 
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mere presence of the actress on the screen. The children with ASD did, however, show 
atypical looking patterns (particularly reduced attention to the scene, the actress’s face, 
and the actress’s mouth) when viewing the Dyadic Bid scene in which the actress was 
looking directly at the camera and using child-directed speech. Interestingly, the Joint 
Attention scene did not demonstrate atypical looking patterns to the same extent as the 
Dyadic Bid scene, likely due to the limited eye contact and speech production used in this 
scene. Chawarska and colleagues concluded that “limited attention to faces appeared 
context-dependent and was linked to the presence of explicit cues for dyadic 
engagement” (p. 909). These findings provide support for atypical visual fixation patterns 
associated with varying contexts, however more research is needed to build on the 
evidence presented by Chawarska et al. (2012).  
1.4 Brain Imaging Studies in ASD 
 Recent brain-imaging studies have provided researchers with data regarding the 
neural abnormalities of persons with ASD. These studies, which have been used in 
conjunction with behavioral and eye tracking studies, have resulted in an increased 
knowledge about the underlying mechanisms involved in the facial emotion recognition 
deficits present in ASD (Harms et al., 2010). This research is in line with the amygdala 
hypothesis of autism, which proposes that the features of ASD are rooted in amygdala 
dysfunction and, indeed, several researchers have cited similarities in the performance of 
persons with ASD and those with amygdala dysfunction (Ashwin et al., 2006; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2000; Spezio, Huang, Castelli, & Adolphs, 2007). Many of the abilities that 
are negatively affected are linked to lack of direct eye gaze (Grice et al., 2005), impaired 
judgment of trustworthiness of others (Adolphs, Sears, & Piven, 2001), and 
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facial/emotional recognition (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Much of the research has 
focused on activation of the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus (FG). 
Decreased activation of the amygdala is evident in neuroimaging studies 
monitoring the brain activity of persons with ASD while processing facial emotions 
(Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O’Riordan, & Bullmore, 2007; Pelphrey, Morris, 
McCarthy, & Labar, 2007) and mental states (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Ashwin et al. 
(2006) demonstrated that the impairments seen in participants with ASD in recognizing 
negative emotions (e.g., fear, anger, disgust) are similar to those facial emotion 
recognition deficits observed in individuals with considerable amygdala damage. Spezio 
et al. (2007) heightened these findings through a study of an individual with amygdala 
damage and her impairments in eye contact during live conversations. These researchers 
found that the impairments associated with extensive amygdala damage are similar to 
those observed in persons with ASD. It is suggested that amygdala dysfunction and those 
corresponding impairments seen in ASD negatively affects the ability to link social 
stimuli with social meaning (Adolphs et al., 2001). 
In addition to the amygdala, activation of the fusiform gyrus is typically evident 
during both face perception and recognition of emotions (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000; 
Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Grelotti, Gauthier, & Schultz, 2002; Grelotti et al., 
2005; Harms et al., 2010; Jemel, Mottron, & Dawson, 2006; Schultz, 2005). In TD 
individuals, the fusiform face area (FFA) is activated by face perception, as well as other 
non-face objects for which the individual has object expertise (Jemel et al., 2006). 
Neuroimaging studies have found that persons with ASD show decreased activation of 
the FFA when processing faces. Interestingly, it has been reported that when individuals 
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with ASD process faces, their inferior temporal gyrus is activated, which is typically the 
area of the brain that is used to process objects in TD individuals (Schultz et al., 2000).  
 Event-related potentials (ERP) in response to facial stimuli have provided 
additional insight into the ways people process faces. More specifically, primary visual 
information is believed to be processed at a low level using bottom-up (i.e., stimulus-
driven) processing. Information is aggregated at the low-level and subsequently sent to 
higher levels where the organization of information is refined and details of information 
are elaborated. Top-down (i.e., knowledge-driven) processes are also triggered early in 
visual information processing whereby concept-level information contributes to category 
identification and object recognition. In short, bottom-up processing may occur as details 
of a visual stimulus are processed independently of the larger concept but the two are 
ultimately linked to form a complete visual representation of the object. Maekawa and 
colleagues (2011) found that individuals with ASD demonstrate abnormal top-down 
processing strategies, yet intact bottom-up processing abilities. They concluded that 
individuals with ASD use feature-based strategies, as opposed to holistic-based strategies, 
in FER tasks due to the abnormal processing abilities that occur early on in the process of 
visual sensory information. In summary then, information processing at the 
neuroanatomical (i.e., in particular the FFA and amygdala) has been implicated.   
1.5 Summary and Statement of the Problem 
 Evidence is mixed regarding visual attention to faces in ASD. While some 
researchers did not find differences between the visual allocation patterns of participants 
with ASD and those who are TD (Snow et al., 2011; Falkmer et al., 2010), these studies 
reported on visual attention to static stimuli. Static stimuli do not engage participants in a 
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way that mimics real life nor does it provide information in socially relevant contexts 
(McPartland et al., 2011). Dynamic studies, on the other hand, suggest that participants 
with ASD employ atypical looking patterns when viewing faces (Klin et al., 2002; 
Norbury et al., 2009). The mixed findings between stimuli suggest that the looking 
patterns (in those with ASD) toward static and dynamic stimuli differ. Even fewer studies 
examine how visual attention is affected by conversational contexts. The following study 
addresses these gaps in the literature by examining the within- and between-group 
differences in the visual attention of TD and ASD. This will be accomplished using a 
Skyped conversation where participants with ASD and TD are asked to engage in a 
conversation about “things that people do” (the mundane context) and “things that people 
feel” (the emotion-laden context). Based on the aforementioned research, we 
hypothesized that 1) children with ASD would visually attend less to the eye region and 
more to the mouth region of the face compared to TD children and that 2) this effect 
would be exaggerated in the emotion-laden conversation. We also sought to explore 
factors related to atypical visual allocation in ASD during conversation. This was 
accomplished by examining the correlations between factors of interest (e.g., ToM, EF) 





Chapter 2: Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were 19 typically developing children (15 males, 4 females) ages 6 
years, 3 months to 12 years, 11 months (M = 8 years, 8 months, SD =2.23) and 18 
children (15 males, 3 female) ages 6 years, 1 month to 11 years, 9 months (M = 9 years, 3 
months, SD = 1.55) diagnosed with ASD. All typically developing children were 
identified on the basis of parental report. More specifically, parents responded to a 
questionnaire designed to screen for a variety of conditions. Parents were asked to report 
whether their child had ever received a diagnosis or were ever concerned about the 
presence of a developmental delay (including ASD), learning impairment, speech and 
language impairment, and uncorrected visual or hearing impairment.  
On the basis of parental report, four children had a diagnosis of autism, six had a 
diagnosis of Pervasive Developmental Disorder – Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS), 
and eight had a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). All children had been diagnosed by a psychologist or developmental pediatrician. 
Six children in the ASD group also had a concomitant diagnosis of Attention-Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder or Attention-Deficit Disorder. One child in the ASD group was 
functionally nonverbal (characterized by parental report as having “limited speech”) but 
was able to attend to stimuli making collection of the eye tracking data possible. All 17 
remaining children were verbal and could use language functionally and flexibly. 
2.2 Measures 
 As described in this paper’s introduction, several constructs have been implicated 
in atypical visual attention to faces in ASD. Measures for many of these constructs (ToM, 
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EF, autism severity) were employed in this study to examine whether they predicted 
atypical visual attention. Data for general and subscale intelligence were also collected. 
These data were included in the predictor analyses but also used to evaluate whether our 
ASD and TD groups were distribution matched on general intelligence.  
2.2.1 Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function.  The Behavior Rating 
Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF; Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000) is a 
parent and/or teacher informant measure designed to assess executive function behaviors 
in individuals ages 5 through 18.  The test is composed of 86 items divided into eight 
categories: Inhibit, Shift, Emotional Control, Initiate, Working Memory, Plan/Organize, 
Organization of Materials, and Monitor. Scores are reported for each of the categories as 
well as an overall behavioral index, a metacognition index, and a global executive 
composite.  The BRIEF has been evaluated for reliability (internal consistency, test-
retest, and interrater) and validity (convergent and divergent) and has demonstrated 
adequate psychometric properties (Schraw, 2003). 
2.2.2 The Gilliam Autism Rating Scale-2. The Gilliam Autism Rating Scale, 
second edition (GARS-2; Gilliam, 2006) is a norm-referenced rating scale based on the 
definitions of autism adopted by the Autism Society of America and the DSM-IV.  The 
GARS-2 is typically used as a screening tool with children between the ages of 3 and 22 
who show signs indicative of ASD.  There are 42 items separated into three subscales: 
communication, social interaction, and stereotyped behaviors. This scale assesses 
behaviors using objective frequency-based ratings by individuals familiar with the 
individual and takes approximately 5-10 minutes to complete. The combined scores on 
these subscales yield an autism index (AI) score (with a mean of 100 and SD of 15), 
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which provides a total score assessing the probability of autism and the degree of 
severity. Statistically significant validity and reliability (internal consistency, test-retest, 
and interrater reliability) were reported for each of the test domains and the AI (Lopez-
Wagner, Hoffman, Sweeney, & Hodge, 2008).  
2.2.3 The Theory of Mind (ToM) Task Battery.  The ToM Task Battery 
(Hutchins, Prelock, & Chace, 2008) consists of 13 questions designed to tap a range of 
ToM tasks. The items range in complexity and are presented in the form of static visual 
stimuli. The initial task tests the ability to identify emotions associated with facial 
expressions, the second asks children to infer an emotion associated with a desire.  The 
remaining tasks assess advanced abilities including belief-based emotion, reality-based 
emotion, second-order belief-based emotion, perception-based belief, and false beliefs. 
The ToM Task Battery has been evaluated for reliability (test-retest, internal consistency), 
which was adequate (Hutchins et al., 2008). 
2.2.4 The Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence.  The Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) is a brief norm-referenced IQ 
test for individuals between the ages of 6 and 89.  The WASI is composed of four 
subtests: vocabulary, similarities, block design and matrix reasoning, yielding a verbal IQ 
score, a performance IQ score, and a full IQ score.  The WASI has been evaluated for 
reliability (internal consistency, test-retest) and validity, and has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties (Lindskog & Smith, 2010).  
2.3 Apparatus 
Eye movements were recorded using the Mirametrix S2 Eye Tracker System to 
record X and Y coordinates of eye position. The screen-capture system promoted more 
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natural behavior since it did not place restraints on participants such as a helmet, head-
mounted sensor, or glasses. The system utilized a sampling rate of 60 Hz yielding an 
accuracy of .5-1 degree of the visual angle. Eye blinks and off screen gazes were 
identified by loss of corneal reflection and were excluded from the data. Participants were 
seated at a desk in front of a 22-inch computer monitor (1680 X 1050 pixels resolution) 
located approximately two feet away. The eye tracker was positioned just below the 
computer screen. Presentation of the stimuli was captured using Viewer software in 
Mirametrix and the resulting data was managed by conducting analyses of CSV (Comma 
Separated Values) files. Fixation calculation parameters for gaze were set at 20 pixels 
(for the maximum distance in pixels that a point may vary from the average fixation point 
and still be considered a fixation) and 2 samples (minimum number of samples to be 
considered a fixation) with 3 degrees of visual angle. Participants’ gazes were calibrated 
quantitatively in the following manner:  
The user is required to look at these coordinates, in such a manner that the 
system associates to each of these a specific relative position of both the 
flint and pupil centers. Once these nine points are successfully recorded 
(about 15 seconds), the system is able to track the point-of-regard in every 
position of the screen, by means of computer vision techniques and 
trigonometric calculations. The mirametrix S2 device specifies that there 
will never be a drift over 0.3 degrees. Furthermore the device takes less 
than 16ms to reacquire the eyes image in case of need. Following the 
official device’ specifications, its accuracy is in the range of 0.5-1 degrees 
of visual angle, meaning that with the user staying at 50 cm from the 
device, the error in the screen is going to be in the range of 0.44 cm to 
0.87 cm approximately (Barral, 2013, p. 17). 
 
2.4 Conversation Types 
Two different conversational contexts were examined: a conversation about 
things that people do (the mundane conversation) and a conversation about things that 
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people feel (the emotion-laden conversation). The primary investigator participated in a 
Skype conversation with the participant by asking the participant a variety of questions 
about mundane and emotion-laden topics (see Appendix 1 for a full list of the questions 
asked). For each question that the primary investigator asked, she attempted to elicit at 
least two responses from the child. Once a minimum of two responses were secured, the 
experimenter continued to the next question.  
2.5 Procedure 
Participants with ASD were recruited via informal contacts as well as notices to 
local support agencies for families with children with ASD. Additionally, six participants 
with ASD were recruited through an ad placed in the local newspaper. Participants with 
typical development were recruited via fliers and informal contacts. Parents received 
$25.00 compensation for participation in the study. Upon arrival to the laboratory, 
informed consent was obtained from a parent. The children were seated in front of the 
computer screen for the Skype conversation. The children were given the instruction 
“find your sweet spot” if they were looking at the computer screen but their eyes were not 
picked up by the eye tracker. Participants’ eye gazes were calibrated using quantitative 
measures (described above) as well as visual confirmation (i.e., they were asked to look 
at particular objects on the screen and it was noted where their eyes were fixating on the 
computer screen). Visual confirmation checks were informal and used as necessary. 
Children were not repositioned if they were looking off the screen during thinking time or 
when answering questions so as to simulate a real conversation where it is not required to 
use constant eye contact. The primary investigator would ask the question “Tell me about 
things that people do for work.” After the child gave at least two responses, he/she would 
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be asked another question. If the child had difficulty giving two answers, the primary 
investigator would say, “Can you think of anything else that people do for work?” If the 
child answered with, “No” or “I don’t know,” a new questioned was asked. There were 
no time limits on how long a child’s answer was or how long the child engaged in think 
time. 
One random order for the stimuli was determined with the order in which the 
questions were asked. The order of conversational context was counterbalanced so that 
each order (do and feel) was as equally represented as possible. This study was part of a 
larger series of eye tracking studies using different sets of stimuli. Each set of stimuli was 
also presented in a counterbalanced order so that each order was as equally represented as 
possible. 
After the gathering of the eye tracking data during the Skype conversation, the 
ToM Task Battery and the WASI were administered (in that order). During this time, 
parents were asked to complete the BRIEF and the GARS-2. The completion of all data 
collection procedures took between two to three hours. 
2.6 Dependent Variables 
 Areas of interest (AOIs) were chosen based on the upper and lower regions of the 
face, as well as “other” AOIs. The upper region included the eyes and brows and 
extended to the temple area of the face. The lower region included the mouth. All “other” 
AOIs included all other areas of the screen, as well as off-screen looking time (see Figure 
1). Data were collected for the number of fixations and the total proportional fixation 
time for each AOI in each condition (i.e., doing, feeling). 
Research examining eye gaze to faces suggests that the nature of the viewing task 
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influences spatial (e.g., fixation location) and temporal parameters (e.g., fixation 
duration) and some researchers have proposed independent mechanisms for control of 
these parameters (Mills, Hollingworth, Van der Sticgchel, Hoffman, & Dodd, 2011). 
Because we were interested in how conversational topic might influence spatio-temporal 
properties of eye gaze to faces, we examined the number of fixations and total fixation 
time to specific AOIs. Information about the number of fixations provides data regarding 
goal-directed visual search and reflects real-time orienting decisions based on current 
cognitive needs. By contrast, fixation duration is “crucially linked to information 
processing and can reflect ongoing visual processing during scene viewing” (Mills et al., 
2011, p. 2). Greater fixation time is typically associated with increased cognitive demand, 
as when processing difficult words in a reading task (Pollatsek, Rayner, & Bolata, 1986) 




Chapter 3: Results 
3.1 Participant Characteristics 
 Data for matching variables were submitted to a series of independent samples t-
tests. No differences were found for the variables of child age or gender (p > .45 for 
each). Differences were observed for the WASI-2 verbal section (p = .003) and for the 
WASI-2 full scale (p = .02). It should be noted that these differences appear to be due to 
over-performance by the TD group which were typically 1 SD above the mean (WASI-2 
verbal section M = 116.00; SD = 16.42; WASI-2 full scale M = 112.84; SD = 14.90). The 
average scores for the group with ASD were well within normal range for the verbal 
section (M = 94.89; SD = 23.75), as well as for the WASI-2 full scale (M = 98.44; SD = 
20.66). All participants with ASD also completed the GARS-2 (M = 87.11; SD = 16.23), 
indicating that our sample generally fell within the range of mild autism severity and 
were considered high-functioning.   
Boneferroni tests to correct for family-wise error rate were not conducted for 
these data. Given the large number of comparisons and the exploratory nature of this 
research, it is important to protect against the likelihood of multiple Type II errors 
(Hewes, 2003). 
3.2 Hypothesis 1 
 Recall that hypothesis 1 was: Children with ASD will attend less to the eye region 
and more to the mouth region of the face compared to TD children in both conversational 
contexts. To address this hypothesis, data for mean number of fixations and mean 
fixation time for the three AOIs (i.e., eyes, mouth, and background) were first analyzed 
descriptively. These data are presented in Figures 2 and 3. Because time varied across 
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groups and conditions, it was controlled in all subsequent analyses by dividing the values 
for the variables of interest by total time spent during interaction. Data were then 
analyzed inferentially using a series of 2 (group: ASD, TD) X 2 (condition: mundane, 
emotion-laden) mixed model Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) with repeated measures 
on condition. No main effects for group were found for either number of fixations or 
fixation time data. Thus, contrary to our expectation, participants with ASD did not 
attend less to the eyes and more to the mouth region compared to TD peers in both the 
mundane and emotion-laden conversations, suggesting that looking patterns across 
conditions were similar across groups.    
However, a main effect for group was observed for additional t-tests that we 
conducted. First, we found a main effect for total off-screen looking time (seconds), 
F(1,33.51) = 8.19, p < .01, such that participants with ASD spent significantly more time 
looking off-screen (M = 244.1; SD = 54.4) compared to their TD peers (M = 26.4; SD = 
53.0) regardless of condition. These data are presented in Figure 4.  We also observed a 
main effect for group for average fixation duration to eyes such that participants with 
ASD had significantly longer fixation durations in the doing condition (M = .42; SD = 
.24) compared to the TD group (M = .28; SD = .07), t(35) = 2.39, p = .03, and the ASD 
group had significantly longer fixation durations to the eyes in the feeling condition (M = 
.41; SD = .27) compared to the TD group (M = .30; SD = .11), t(35) = 1.71, p = .11. 
Finally, a main effect for average fixation duration to the mouth was observed, such that 
the ASD group had significantly longer fixation durations in the doing condition (M = 
.38; SD = .29) compared to the TD group (M = .17; SD = .10), t(35) = 2.99, p = .01, and 
the ASD group had significantly longer fixation durations to the mouth in the feeling 
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condition (M = .41; SD = .32) compared to the TD group (M = .17; SD = .11), t(35) = 
3.13, p = .01. No significant differences were found between groups and across 
conditions for average fixation duration to the background. These data are presented in 
Figures 5 and 6. In summary, number of fixations to eye and mouth and total fixation 
time to eye and mouth did not differ between groups, but the group with ASD looked off-
screen more than the TD group. When looking at eye and mouth regions (but not the 
background), the group with ASD also had longer average fixation durations compared to 
the TD group. 
3.3 Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 was: Children with ASD will visually attend less to the eyes and 
more to the mouth during conversation and that this effect would be exaggerated in the 
emotion-laden condition. In short, conversational topic will moderate visual attention in 
ASD such that we should observe less eye looking and more mouth looking in the 
emotion-laden condition compared to the mundane condition. 
The total looking time to eye, mouth, and background AOIs were submitted to 
three mixed model 2 (group: typically developing vs. ASD) X 2 (condition: doing, 
feeling) ANOVAs with repeated measures for condition. All analyses were corrected for 
time. An interaction was observed for total (cumulative) time looking at the mouth AOI, 
such that participants with ASD spent significantly more time (seconds), F(1, 34.50) = 
4.87,  p < .05), looking at the mouth in the feeling condition (M = 35.46; SD = 5.00) 
compared to TD peers (M = 17.76; SD = 4.75). Time spent looking at the mouth was not 
significantly different between groups in the doing condition. This interaction is 
represented in Figures 7 and 8. 
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 The total number of fixations to eye, mouth, and background AOIs were 
submitted to three mixed model 2 (group: typically developing vs. ASD) X 2 (condition: 
doing, feeling) ANOVAs with repeated measures for condition. An interaction was found 
for number of fixations to the eye region of the face. Participants with ASD fixated 
significantly less on the eye region, F(1, 34.43) = 5.74 , p <.05), in the feeling condition 
(M = 105.81; SD = 15.47) compared to TD peers (M = 167.82; SD = 14.66). Number of 
fixations to the eye AOI was not significant in the doing condition. This interaction is 
represented in Figures 8 and 9. 
3.4 Research Question 1 
 Recall that research question 1 was: What factors predict visual allocation during 
conversation? To address this question, data for total time and number of fixations to eye, 
mouth, and background regions (i.e., outside eye and mouth AOIs) were correlated with 
measures of interest (i.e., ToM, EF, IQ, autism severity, age). Results indicated high 
collinearity among all variables presenting challenges to both statistical analysis and 
interpretation. To address this issue, change scores were calculated for dependent 
variables that showed a significant effect in our mixed model analyses reported above. 
That is, change scores were used to quantify the degree of shift in visual attention 
revealed in our two interaction effects. In the ASD group, attention away from the eye 
region (fewer fixations) in the emotion-laden condition was negatively correlated with 
age (p = .04), perceptual reasoning (p = .04), and EF subscales: working memory (p = 
.003) plan/organize (p = .001), and organization of materials (p = .015), and positively 
correlated with autism severity (p = .04). In the ASD group, increased attention (total 
amount of time) to the mouth region in the emotion-laden condition was negatively 
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correlated with verbal IQ (p  = .014), general IQ (p = .012), ToM competence (p = .035), 
and positively correlated with autism severity (p = .047). Increased mouth looking was 
also negatively correlated with EF subscales (inhibit p = .098, initiate p = .099, monitor p 
= .059), but these effects were marginal. In the TD group, no significant correlations were 
found for changes in number of fixations to the eye region from the doing to feeling 
condition (presumably a ceiling effect); however time spent attending to the mouth region 
decreased in the emotion-laden condition; a shift that was positively correlated with age 
(p = .04), verbal IQ (p = .05), matrix reasoning (p = .03), and general IQ (p = .01). These 
findings are represented in Figures 10 and 11.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
 Atypical looking patterns are often observed in children and adults with ASD and 
previous research has found mixed results regarding the visual fixation patterns of 
children with ASD with regard to both static and dynamic stimuli. Few studies have 
examined the effect of dynamic stimuli in the form of conversation on visual fixation 
patterns, and even fewer have explored different conversational contexts on these fixation 
strategies. The present study was designed to address this gap in the literature by 
analyzing the visual allocation strategies of TD children and children with ASD when 
engaged in conversations about mundane and emotion-laden topics. 
4.1 Hypothesis 1 
Recall that hypothesis 1 was: Children with ASD will attend less to the eye region 
and more to the mouth region of the face compared to TD children in both the mundane 
and emotion-laden conversational contexts. With regard to looking at the speaker’s eyes 
and mouth, the visual allocation strategies of participants with ASD did not differ from 
those of their TD peers during both conversational contexts. This provides support for 
previous research that failed to find differences in the visual allocation patterns of those 
with ASD compared to TD and argues that visual attention in TD and ASD is more 
similar than dissimilar (Falkmer et al., 2010; Snow et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
children with ASD in this study also tended to look away from the speaker (in our case, 
“off-screen”) across both conversational topics compared to their TD peers. This finding 
provides evidence that visual attention to a speaking partner is not equivalent across 
groups, and is consistent with evidence for inattention and lack of eye contact in ASD 
that are well documented (Charwarska et al., 2012; Joseph & Tanaka, 2003; Klin et al., 
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2002). These findings remind us that claims regarding the similarity and dissimilarity of 
visual attention in ASD and TD must be tethered to specific research questions and 
methods; findings that might first seem contradictory are not when they are understood in 
light of their specific operationalizations. 
A main effect of group for average fixation duration to eyes and mouth revealed 
that participants with ASD tended to fixate longer on the speaker’s eyes and mouth 
compared to their TD peers. This suggests more effortful and/or less efficient information 
processing presumably due to higher cognitive load in ASD across conditions. With 
regard to the number of fixations and total fixation time to eye and mouth regions, the 
descriptive data also reveal a portrait of more evenly distributed visual search and 
allocation to scenes with faces in ASD. Whereas the TD group seemed more selective 
and biased in visual search and information processing, the allocation of visual attention 
in ASD appears less strategic which may reflect underlying challenges in face processing, 
emotion reading, and ultimately, ToM. 
4.2 Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that the emotion-laden conversation (i.e., feeling 
condition) would be associated with more atypical visual allocation strategies in 
participants with ASD compared to the mundane conversation (i.e., doing condition). In 
support of this hypothesis, we found a group by condition interaction for two dependent 
variables: the number of fixations to eyes and the cumulative time spent looking to the 
mouth region. Each effect will be examined in turn. 
Conversational topic moderates number of fixations to eyes. Participants with 
ASD showed significantly fewer fixations to the eyes in the emotion-laden (but not 
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mundane) conversation compared to their TD peers.  This is consistent with the findings 
from Baron-Cohen et al. (1997), who noted that as the complexity of emotions increased, 
persons with ASD demonstrated a decreased ability to decode information from the eyes. 
Of course, this interpretation raises a concern for children with ASD because eye 
information may be more relevant in conversations about emotions compared to mundane 
talk. It is precisely when these opportunities occur for learning the links between facial 
expression and underlying mental states (as well as the pragmatics of display rules) that 
children with ASD tend to neglect the regions of the visual field that help them decode 
the subtle social cues given in the eyes. 
Conversational topic moderates looking time to mouth. Additionally, 
participants with ASD spent significantly longer fixating on the speaker’s mouth in the 
emotion-laden (but not mundane) conversation compared to TD controls. One 
explanation for increased mouth looking has been suggested by Klin et al. (2002). They 
propose that children with ASD tend to look at the mouth more than TD peers because 
the mouth is moving during speech production and “by concentrating their efforts on 
something they understand, they might attain better understanding of social situations” 
(p. 814). Similar to the socially charged videos in Klin’s study, our findings revealed that 
children with ASD spend more time looking at the mouth during emotional 
conversations, which are more socially charged than talk about mundane topics. While 
Klin’s study focused solely on socially charged content, our study addressed both 
mundane and emotion-laden contexts.   
Conversational topic moderates visual attention to faces. Taken together, our 
results for hypothesis 2 reveal that conversational context moderates the relationship 
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between developmental status (ASD, TD) and visual allocation to the face of a speaking 
partner. These findings suggest that as the conversational task becomes more difficult, 
children with ASD shift visual attention from the eyes to the mouth. The emotion-laden 
conversation is likely more difficult because of the demands it places on ToM: a 
characteristic impairment of ASD. As a result, visual attention may be shifted to 
compensate for workload and conserve cognitive resources. Our findings align with those 
of Rutherford and Towns (2008), who found that when participants with ASD were asked 
to identify emotions, the complexity of the emotions moderated their visual attention to 
the person’s face; as the complexity of the emotions increased, the visual allocation 
strategies shifted from the eye to the mouth area.   
4.3 Research Question 1 
 Research question 1 was: “What factors predict visual allocation during 
conversation?” In our study, the TD sample shifted from fewer to more eye fixations and 
more to less mouth time in the emotion-laden conversation. Greater degrees of shifting 
from the mouth to the eyes were positively related to age, verbal ability, general IQ, and 
matrix reasoning in the TD sample. This suggests highly specialized and context-
sensitive face viewing strategies with a critical developmental component. By contrast, 
the ASD sample shifted from more to fewer eye fixations and less to more mouth time in 
the emotion-laden conversation. The shift in TD children toward the eyes in the emotion 
condition appears to be driven by healthy developmental processes, but the shift in ASD 
away from the eyes and toward the mouth requires further scrutiny. When we solve 
problems, our prior knowledge usually helps us by efficiently guiding us toward solutions 
that have worked for us in the past. This seems to be at work in the TD sample, but it may 
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or may not be at work in the ASD sample and it could be that in the mind of a person 
with ASD, the mouth (not the eyes) provides the most useful social information. 
However, one piece of evidence that argues against this possibility is that for the ASD 
group, decreasing (not increasing) age predicted more shift away from the eyes. In other 
words, as children with ASD in our study got older, they tended to not shift attention 
away from the eyes during the emotion-laden conversation to the degree that the younger 
children did. This could be a result of more social experience or general learning and 
maturation.  
A weaker, more plausible form of this hypothesis might then be that under 
conditions of high cognitive load, the mouth provides the most salient or easily detectable 
face information for monitoring engagement and responses of a speaking partner. From 
this perspective, mouths could be salient for a variety of reasons. Perhaps they are salient 
due to their size and/or the fact that they move and produce audio-visual synchrony, 
which may aid in the disambiguation of speech sounds (Buchan et al., 2008; Klin et al., 
2002, Jones & Klin, 2008). This would be consistent with a model wherein visual 
attention to low-level (largely bottom-up) features of visual input may compensate for 
limited cognitive resources due to load demands. Notably, Rutherford and Towns (2008) 
found similar results and concluded that it is “as if the more complex the target, the 
simpler the source of information must be” (p. 1379).  
This simple principle of resource allocation is often illustrated by way of the 
‘driving in a snow storm’ example. Driving in good conditions on a familiar route is not, 
relatively speaking, resource demanding: the act of driving almost becomes automatized 
and frees memory, attention, and planning cognitive reserves. By contrast, driving an 
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unfamiliar route during a snowstorm is effortful and strains attention resources. Perhaps 
the emotion-laden condition caused participants with ASD to shift their visual attention in 
a way that the mundane condition did not. For individuals with ASD, engaging in 
emotion-laden conversations may be like driving in a snowstorm. This interpretation is 
consistent with the ToM hypothesis of ASD literature and aligns with previous research 
suggesting that social impairment and atypical visual attention are positively correlated in 
ASD (Elsabbagh et al., 2014; Speer, Cook, McMahon, & Clark, 2007).  
Of course, when considering ToM effects in ASD, the role of EF cannot be 
overlooked. As previously described, Zelazo et al. (2013) have argued that hot EF and 
ToM are essentially the same construct and there is physiological evidence to support this 
assertion (e.g., Ashwin et al., 2007; Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). In the context of our 
interaction effects, one interpretation is that our two conversational contexts may 
differentially recruit hot and cold EF.  
As indicated earlier in the Introduction section of this paper, how EF and its 
relation to ToM are constructed will shape one’s interpretation of the results. Two sub-
processes may be particularly relevant for this discussion: working memory and 
inhibition (see Moses et al., 2005/2013; Welsh, 2002/2008). Working memory and 
inhibition are often construed as independent, yet interrelated, processes and they may be 
important for understanding the attention shifting in the emotion-laden conversation that 
was observed for the ASD group in this study (see Figure 12). In our emotion-laden 
conversation, it may be that working memory contributes significantly to data for number 
of fixations (i.e., our eye-looking data). This may reflect a change in visual search 
strategy and implicates poor EF as a potential cause of the decreased number of fixations 
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to the eye region. Perhaps children with ASD stop scanning the eye region because those 
stimuli are complex and difficult to read. That is, the cognitively demanding load that 
emotionally charged topics place on working memory may make rendering information 
from the eye region particularly difficult to interpret and the child with ASD may set off 
on a search for more easily accessible social information.  
It may also be that inhibition contributes significantly to data for looking time 
(i.e., our mouth-looking data). In the emotion-laden condition, poor EF may primarily 
reflect deficits in inhibition, which may lead to increased mouth looking. More mouth 
looking may, in turn, implicate an impaired top-down attentional process (related to 
deficits in ToM) and intact bottom-up processing in ASD, which is consistent with some 
previous research (Klin et al., 2002; Neumann, Spezio, Piven, & Adolphs, 2006). 
Indeed, in this study, different kinds of visual attention to different regions of a 
speaking partner’s face appear to involve distinct cognitive mechanisms. In the ASD 
group, greater degrees of shifting away from the eye region were negatively correlated 
with age, perceptual reasoning, and EF subscales: working memory, planning/organizing, 
and organization of materials, and positively correlated with autism severity. 
Furthermore, greater degrees of shifting toward the mouth region were negatively 
correlated with verbal IQ, general IQ, ToM competence, EF subscales: inhibit, initiate, 
and monitor, and positively correlated with autism severity. Our findings implicated 
different facets of visual attention (i.e., fixations to eyes and time to mouth). This is 
consistent with previous arguments that fixation and looking time are under the control of 
different cognitive operations (Mills et al., 2011). The fact that eye fixation shifting and 
mouth time shifting were predicted by different sets of variables in the TD and ASD 
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samples further supports this assertion. As described above, one possibility is that eye 
fixation shifting is related to visual search (Mills et al., 2011; Theeuwes, 2012) and 
mouth time shifting is predicted by cognitive load (Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 
2004; Pollatsek et al., 1986). 
4.4 Clinical Implications  
 Results of this study suggest that it is important to consider the stimuli and 
context in which intervention takes place. As previously discussed, there is mixed 
evidence for abnormal looking patterns when viewing static stimuli. Eye tracking 
technology reveals that there is a general consensus for abnormal visual allocation 
strategies during dynamic stimuli studies where participants with ASD are asked to view 
stimuli analogous to real-world settings. Since the present study was similar to a true 
conversational exchange, it is likely that when conversational exchanges are cognitively 
demanding and require the use of ToM, individuals with ASD allocate their visual 
attention to the speaking partner’s mouth. For this reason, clinicians should carefully 
consider whether and when establishing sustained eye contact is a meaningful, important, 
or appropriate target of intervention. Clinicians should also note that when engaged in 
conversations that are cognitively demanding and require the use of ToM skills, eye 
contact may be especially rare in children with ASD. However, making eye contact is not 
a prerequisite for sharing attention. Interventionists might instead consider sharing 
attention to an object or activity by sitting beside a client with ASD to facilitate joint 
attention and shared meaning making. 
Instructing students with ASD to “look at me” during therapy and conversational 
exchanges has the potential to overload cognitive resources particular during tasks that 
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are already challenging because of their social nature. When cognitive resources are 
depleted, persons with ASD may experience difficulty accessing and taking meaning 
from the speaker and the speaker’s message. According to Temple Grandin (Edelson & 
Grandin, 1996), “…if you start forcing eye contact, you are going to send the nervous 
system into sensory overload. [Those with ASD] will then shut down, and nothing is 
going to get through to them. They are ‘mono channel,’ and they can use only one sense 
at a time.” This account rings true to John-Paul Bovee who is an adult who was 
diagnosed with ASD as a toddler. He states that “just because I am not making eye 
contact with you does not mean that I am not listening to you or paying attention to you. I 
can concentrate better not having to keep eye contact at the same time. I tell people, ‘you 
have a choice. Do you want a conversation or do you want eye contact? You will not get 
both unless I am comfortable with you and do not have to concentrate so much on the eye 
contact” (Bovee, 1999 as cited in Stuart, 2000). In an interview about ASD, Grandin 
describes how forced eye contact can affect those with ASD: 
Donna Williams (1994) explained that forced eye contact caused her brain 
to shut down. She states when people spoke to her, "their words become a 
mumble jumble, their voices a pattern of sounds" (Painter 1992). She can 
use only one sensory channel at a time. If Donna is listening to somebody 
talk, she is unable to perceive a cat jumping up on her lap. If she attends to 
the cat, then speech perception is blocked. She realized a black thing was 
on her lap, but she did not recognize it as a cat until she stopped listening 
to her friend talk. 
 
She explained that if she listens to the intonation of speech, she can't hear 
the words. Only one aspect of incoming input can be attended to at a time. 
If she is distracted by the visual input of somebody looking in her face, 
she can't hear them. Other people with Autism have explained that they 
had a difficult time determining that speech was used for communication. 
Kins, a man with Autism, further explained that if somebody looked him 
in the eye, "My mind went blank and thoughts stop; it was like a twilight 
state" (Grandin, 2000). 
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These personal accounts describe the cognitive difficulty surrounding 
making eye contact. Not only is making eye contact uncomfortable for many 
people with ASD (Eye Contact Question, 2010), it also places a high demand on 
their EF system which has important implications for practice.  
One idea worthy of future research is that when eye contact is a goal for meeting 
the expectations of listeners, and to make eye contact seem more natural even when it is 
not, it may be worthwhile to train eye gaze to face regions near the eyes but not directly 
to the eyes themselves. This might have the effect of increasing the impression of socially 
appropriate regulation of eye gaze, while not increasing cognitive load. This suggestion 
comes from the anecdotal testimony of persons with ASD; however, as far as we are 
aware, no studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of this approach.  
Further support could be provided to children with ASD to reduce cognitive 
demand during ToM-laden activities. This could be done, for example, through the use of 
visual supports and repetition. Indeed, this is exactly what several well-established 
interventions do (e.g., Social Stories). Thus, reducing the cognitive load that is required 
of a person with ASD may remove some of the barriers associated with ToM tasks and 
provide access to increased learning. 
4.5 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Interpretation of the data obtained in this study is limited by the relatively small 
sample size. The literature suggests that a sample size of 25 is sufficient to identify 
effects in visual attention in ASD. Although our sample size was sufficient to detect 
many between- and within-group effects at the .05 level, a small number of effects (that 
are important to our current interpretation of the results) were only detected when alpha 
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was .10. This suggests that the present study was slightly underpowered. 
The ASD and TD groups were not matched on IQ. However, the ASD sample had 
a mean IQ in the normal range and the TD group had a mean IQ that was nearly one 
standard deviation above the mean. While matching the groups on IQ would result in 
more similar groups, it also has the potential to obscure effects associated with the 
diagnosis of ASD  (Harms et al., 2010). In our study, analyses revealed that when the 
effects of verbal mental age were removed, no significant group by condition interactions 
persisted in the omnibus analyses. Therefore, it is difficult to control for IQ and verbal 
mental age and still find group differences, as IQ is “phenotypically linked with ASD” 
(Harms et al., 2010, p. 292).  
Additionally, our data were only collected at one point in time. To address the 
limitations associated with cross-sectional design, future research should follow visual 
attention patterns over time using a longitudinal design. This would allow for 
examination of trends in visual attention over time, which may suggest a critical role of 
maturation. 
Another limitation is that some of our participants had concomitant disorders. 
Specifically, parental report indicated that six participants with ASD also presented with 
ADHD or ADD. Despite any concomitant disorder, these participants were included in 
the study due to the small sample size. It should be noted that the present study was 
unable to assess the impact, if any, that the concomitant disorders or medications may 
have had on the study’s results. ADHD and ADD have a particularly high comorbidity 
rate with ASD, which could be addressed through the use of additional screening 
measures or a more stringent set of inclusion criteria. Additionally, one participant with 
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ASD was functionally non-verbal, while all other participants were verbal and able to 
flexibly use language. This participant’s data were analyzed with the others, as his verbal 
ability did not interfere with the eye tracking technology.  
Additionally, making eye contact and looking other’s in the eye is often reported 
to be difficult for those with ASD. This study did not determine whether children had 
received prior intervention on making eye contact and thus it is unknown whether any 
interventions had an effect on the present study. 
Future research might also examine cognitive load across conditions by 
examining average pupil dilation. Research shows that pupil size tends to be positively 
associated with cognitive load (Hyönä, Tommola, & Alaja, 1995). Further, future 
research could utilize a dual task approach for TD children that measures eye looking 
versus mouth looking in noisy environments. This could assess whether TD individuals’ 
visual allocation is similar to that of those with ASD when cognitive load has been 
increased. Buchan et al. (2008) did find evidence for increased mouth looking in TD 
children during a speech intelligibility task with extraneous background noise; however 
future research could compare similar findings with the increased mouth looking found in 
ASD during cognitively demanding tasks.  
The present study may help to explain the conflicting results in eye tracking and 
ASD literature. Here we have identified several factors that influence the visual attention 
to eye and mouth regions of the face, including age, autism severity, perceptual 
reasoning, verbal and general IQ, and conversational context (and by extension, level of 
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Appendix 1: Skype Conversation Questions 
 
Hi ________. So I want to have a conversation with you. 
First, I want to ask you about what people do. Can you 
tell me… 
What kinds of things do people do people do for work? 
What kinds of things do people do at home? 
What kinds of things do people eat? 
What kinds of things do people do for fun? 
 
Now I’d like to ask you questions about what YOU do.  
Ya know, I have lots of things that I do in the morning. What do you do 
when you get up in the morning? 
And sometimes I have things I like to do with my friends. Tell me, what do 
you do at school at recess time? 
And sometimes I have a dinner routine. What do you do at dinner time? 
And you know what else? I usually have a night time routine. Tell me, what 
do you do before you go to bed at night? 
 
Now I’d like to ask you about feelings. Tell me… 
What kinds of things make people scared? 
What kinds of things make people happy? 
What kinds of things make people sad? 
What kinds of things make people mad? 
 
Now I’d like to talk about YOUR feelings. 
Ya know, sometimes I get scared…like when my dog got lost and I couldn’t 
find her and I didn’t know if she was ok. I was scared. What kinds of things 
scare you? 
And sometimes I get mad like when someone cuts in front of me when I am 
in line. What kinds of things make you mad? 
And sometimes I feel sad like when I can’t spend time with a friend because 
I am too busy. What kinds of things make you sad? 
And ya know what I like to do? I like to watch my favorite movies. These 
things make me happy. What kinds of things make you happy? 
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Figure 1: AOIs for Skype Conversation 
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Figure 4: Main Effect for Group for Total Off-screen Looking Time (seconds). Error bars 





Figure 5: Average Fixation Duration in the Doing Condition. Vertical axis represents 




Figure 6: Average Fixation Duration in the Feeling Condition. Vertical axis represents 














































































Decreased number of fixations 
Increased time 
58  




































Doing	   Feeling	  TD	   ASD	  
No Correlations Found 
(likely a ceiling effect) 
 
Negatively correlated with: 
• Age 
• Perceptual reasoning 
• EF subscales: working memory, 
plan/organize, organization of 
materials 
Positively correlated with: 






























Doing	   Feeling	  TD	   ASD	  
Negatively correlated with: 
• Verbal IQ 
• Full Scale IQ 
• ToM Competence 
• EF subscales: inhibit, initiate, 
monitor 
Positively correlated with: 
• Autism severity 
Positively correlated with: 
• Age 
• Verbal IQ 
• Full Scale IQ 


































Inc.	  Mouth	  Time	  
Working	  Memory	  Dec.	  	  Eye	  Fixations	  
• Higher ASD severity 
• Poorer Verbal IQ 
• Poorer Full Scale IQ 
• Poorer ToM Competence 
• Poorer EF subscales: inhibit, 
initiate, and monitor  
 
• Higher ASD Severity 
• Younger 
• Poorer Perceptual Reasoning 
• Poorer EF subscales: WM, 
plan/organize, organization of 
materials 
 
ASD 
